| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1840 |
| DP1840 Unemployment Duration, Benefit Duration and the Business Cycle | |
| Manuel Arellano; Olympia Bover; Samuel Bentolila | |
| 发表日期 | 1998-03-31 |
| 出版年 | 1998 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We define and study transparency, credibility and reputation in a model where the central bank?s characteristics are unobservable to the private sector and are inferred from the policy outcome. A low-credibility bank optimally conducts a more inflationary policy than a high-credibility bank, in the sense that it induces higher inflation, but a less expansionary policy, in the sense that it induces lower inflation and employment than expected. Increased transparency makes the bank?s reputation and credibility more sensitive to its actions. This has a moderating influence on the bank?s policy. Full transparency of the central bank?s intentions is generally socially beneficial, but frequently not in the interest of the bank. Somewhat paradoxically, direct observability of idiosyncratic central bank goals removes the moderating incentive on the bank and leads to the worst equilibrium. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Reputation Time consistency |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1840 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530980 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Manuel Arellano,Olympia Bover,Samuel Bentolila. DP1840 Unemployment Duration, Benefit Duration and the Business Cycle. 1998. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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