| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1869 |
| DP1869 Wages and Worker Displacement in Germany | |
| Michael Burda; Antje Mertens | |
| 发表日期 | 1998-04-30 |
| 出版年 | 1998 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Most of the literature on the independence of the Central Bank assumes only one policy instrument is available: monetary policy. If we introduce fiscal policy as well, when preferences may differ among policy-makers, the situation is radically different. In this case fiscal policy will weaken substantially the impact of the Central Bank?s actions, and may annihilate them altogether. The Stability Pact may then be a liability, instead of an asset, because it renders both policies impotent (even if credible). We examine whether there is any incentive to retain monetary policy independence; and whether accountability can and should be used to ensure fiscal and monetary policies support each other, rather than destroy each other. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Asymmetries Cooperation Fiscal-monetary interactions Incentives for independence Monetary union |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1869 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531010 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael Burda,Antje Mertens. DP1869 Wages and Worker Displacement in Germany. 1998. |
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