| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1899 |
| DP1899 Fiscal Discipline and Exchange Rate Regimes | |
| Matthew B Canzoneri; Robert Cumby; Behzad Diba | |
| 发表日期 | 1998-05-30 |
| 出版年 | 1998 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this paper, we adopt the vertical differentiation duopoly framework to give a full description of firms? relocation decisions, when the removal either of trade barriers or of restrictions on capital outflows/inflows (?globalization?) allows them to serve the domestic market through foreign plants. We identify the advantages associated with production abroad with the possibility of exploiting a given wage differential. We show that when the liberalization of trade or investment flows yields the relocation of the whole industry, autarchy is strictly better, in welfare terms, than ?globalization?. It is only when relocation is a dominant strategy for one (and only one) of the firms, that ?globalization? may be unambiguously welfare improving. Furthermore, we show that the effects of the relocation of the high or of the low quality firm are different. In particular, if the economy is ?high quality biased? (?low quality biased?) the relocation of the firm producing the high quality variant (the low quality variant) is preferred, in welfare terms, to the relocation of the other firm, if the wage differential is high enough. |
| 主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics |
| 关键词 | Bertrand competition Globalization Production relocation Vertical differentiation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1899 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531015 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Matthew B Canzoneri,Robert Cumby,Behzad Diba. DP1899 Fiscal Discipline and Exchange Rate Regimes. 1998. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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