| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1893 |
| DP1893 Measuring Risk Attitudes in a Natural Experiment: Data from the Television Game Show LINGO | |
| Roel Beetsma; Peter C Schotman | |
| 发表日期 | 1998-06-30 |
| 出版年 | 1998 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper offers an explanation of rationally incomplete contracts, where incompleteness refers to unforeseen contingencies. Agents enter a two-sided moral hazard relationship, in which a commitment to discard parts of the joint resources may be ex-ante efficient. This happens through costly legal dispute which arises when contract terms are missing for undesirable outcomes. We show that an optimal contract needs only to specify the obligation for the more litigious party to assure a certain output level ? the threshold between foreseen and unforeseen contingencies ? and a linear sharing rule for the foreseen contingencies. If litigation reveals some information about the effort levels of the agents, less costly dispute is typically needed and the allocation will improve. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Burning money Contract law Incomplete contracts Team production Unforeseen contingencies |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1893 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531034 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Roel Beetsma,Peter C Schotman. DP1893 Measuring Risk Attitudes in a Natural Experiment: Data from the Television Game Show LINGO. 1998. |
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