G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP1900
DP1900 Ownership and Growth
Thorvaldur Gylfason; Gylfi Zoega; Tryggvi Thor Herbertsson
发表日期1998-06-30
出版年1998
语种英语
摘要This paper compares adversarial with cooperative industrial and trade policies in a dynamic oligopoly game in which a home and foreign firm compete in R&D and output and, because of spillovers, each firm benefits from the other?s R&D. When the government can commit to an export subsidy, such a policy raises welfare relative to cooperation, except when R&D is highly effective and spillovers are near-complete. Without commitment, however, subsidization may yield welfare levels much lower than cooperation and lower even than free trade, though qualifications to the dangers from no commitment are noted.
主题International Trade and Regional Economics
关键词Commitment Cooperative agreements Dynamic consistency Export subsidies R&d spillovers Research and development Research joint ventures (rjv's) Stategic trade policy
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp1900
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531038
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Thorvaldur Gylfason,Gylfi Zoega,Tryggvi Thor Herbertsson. DP1900 Ownership and Growth. 1998.
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