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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP1900 |
DP1900 Ownership and Growth | |
Thorvaldur Gylfason; Gylfi Zoega; Tryggvi Thor Herbertsson | |
发表日期 | 1998-06-30 |
出版年 | 1998 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | This paper compares adversarial with cooperative industrial and trade policies in a dynamic oligopoly game in which a home and foreign firm compete in R&D and output and, because of spillovers, each firm benefits from the other?s R&D. When the government can commit to an export subsidy, such a policy raises welfare relative to cooperation, except when R&D is highly effective and spillovers are near-complete. Without commitment, however, subsidization may yield welfare levels much lower than cooperation and lower even than free trade, though qualifications to the dangers from no commitment are noted. |
主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics |
关键词 | Commitment Cooperative agreements Dynamic consistency Export subsidies R&d spillovers Research and development Research joint ventures (rjv's) Stategic trade policy |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1900 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531038 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Thorvaldur Gylfason,Gylfi Zoega,Tryggvi Thor Herbertsson. DP1900 Ownership and Growth. 1998. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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