| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1902 |
| DP1902 A Bargaining Model of Farrell Inefficiency | |
| Jonathan Haskel; Amparo Sanchis | |
| 发表日期 | 1998-06-30 |
| 出版年 | 1998 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In the course of ordinary business, commercial banks frequently encounter entrepreneurs seeking loans for the purpose of financing new or continuing projects. These entrepreneurs are frequently unrealistic, their perception having been biased by wishful thinking. Bankers are left with a difficult screening problem: separating realists from optimists who may be clever and knowledgeable and completely sincere in their optimistic beliefs. In this paper we model and explore the relationship between banks and possible optimistic entrepreneurs. We examine this capital market from the stand-point of economic efficiency. We show that entrepreneurs may practice self-restraint in their current borrowing in order to signal realism and thus obtain good rates on future loans. But contrary to the conventional wisdom, competition may lead banks to be insufficiently conservative in their dealings with entrepreneurs, despite entrepreneurial self-restraint. Furthermore, we argue that the use of collateral requirements by banks may lead to a further decrease in the level of economic efficiency attained. We discuss bank regulation and bankruptcy rules in connection with the problems that unrealistic entrepreneurs may present. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Bankruptcy law Banks Collateral Entrepreneurs Optimism |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1902 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531040 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jonathan Haskel,Amparo Sanchis. DP1902 A Bargaining Model of Farrell Inefficiency. 1998. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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