| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1912 |
| DP1912 Union Power and Product Market Competition: Evidence from the Airline Industry | |
| Damien J. Neven; Lars-Hendrik Röller; Zhentang Zhang | |
| 发表日期 | 1998-06-30 |
| 出版年 | 1998 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper analyses the impact of public disclosure of banks? risk exposure on banks? risk taking incentives and its implications in terms of soundness of the banking system. We find that, when banks have a complete control over the volatility of their loan portfolio, public disclosure reduces the probability of banking crises. When asset risk is driven largely by exogenous factors beyond the control of bank managers, however, information disclosure may increase banking sector fragility, as the potential gains from a safer choice of assets is offset by the negative feed-back, arising from a positive correlation between asset risk and the deposit rate demanded by informed depositors. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Bank failures Deposit insurance Information disclosure Moral hazard Risk |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1912 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531048 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Damien J. Neven,Lars-Hendrik Röller,Zhentang Zhang. DP1912 Union Power and Product Market Competition: Evidence from the Airline Industry. 1998. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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