| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1918 |
| DP1918 Banking (Conservatively) With Optimists | |
| Michael Manove; Jorge Padilla | |
| 发表日期 | 1998-06-30 |
| 出版年 | 1998 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies the strategic interaction between a foreign direct investor and a host country. We analyse how the investor can use his control rights to protect his investment, if he faces the risk of ?creeping expropriation? once his investment is sunk. It is shown that this hold-up problem may cause underinvestment, if the outside option of the investor is too weak, and overinvestment if it is too strong. We also analyse the impact of spillover effects, give a rationale for ?tax holidays? and examine how stochastic returns affect the strategic interaction of investor and host country. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; International Trade and Regional Economics |
| 关键词 | Foreign direct investment Implicit contracts Sovereign risk |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1918 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531052 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael Manove,Jorge Padilla. DP1918 Banking (Conservatively) With Optimists. 1998. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
| 个性服务 |
| 推荐该条目 |
| 保存到收藏夹 |
| 导出为Endnote文件 |
| 谷歌学术 |
| 谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
| [Michael Manove]的文章 |
| [Jorge Padilla]的文章 |
| 百度学术 |
| 百度学术中相似的文章 |
| [Michael Manove]的文章 |
| [Jorge Padilla]的文章 |
| 必应学术 |
| 必应学术中相似的文章 |
| [Michael Manove]的文章 |
| [Jorge Padilla]的文章 |
| 相关权益政策 |
| 暂无数据 |
| 收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
