| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP1919
|
| DP1919 Trade, Technology and Wages: General Equilibrium Mechanics |
| Joseph Francois; Doug R Nelson
|
| 发表日期 | 1998-07-31
|
| 出版年 | 1998
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We study political compromise founded on tacit cooperation. Two political parties must share a fixed pie in each of an infinite sequence of periods. In each period, the party in power has ultimate authority to divide the pie. Power evolves according to a Markov process among a set of political states corresponding to different degrees of political ?strength? for the two. The political strength of each party is a state variable, and the game is dynamic, rather than repeated. Allocations in an efficient, sub-game perfect equilibrium do not follow a Markov process. Rather, a party?s share reflects not only its current strength, but also how it got there in the recent history. We characterize the efficient division processes for majority rule and supermajority rule, and ask whether one regime allows greater compromise than the other. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics
|
| 关键词 | Compromise
Dynamic games
Policy-making
Political parties
Risk sharing
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1919
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531056
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Joseph Francois,Doug R Nelson. DP1919 Trade, Technology and Wages: General Equilibrium Mechanics. 1998.
|
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