| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP1924
|
| DP1924 What Kind of Regional Convergence? |
| Angel de la Fuente
|
| 发表日期 | 1998-07-31
|
| 出版年 | 1998
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | This paper studies block trades and tender offers as alternative means for transferring corporate control in firms with a dominant minority blockholder and an otherwise dispersed ownership structure. Incumbent and new controlling parties strictly prefer to trade the controlling block. From a social point of view, however, this method is inferior to tender offers, because it preserves a low level of ownership concentration which induces more inefficient extraction of private control benefits. This discrepancy is caused by the free-riding behaviour of small shareholders. Moreover, the controlling block trades at a premium which reflects, in part, the surplus that the incumbent and the acquirer realize by avoiding a tender offer and the consequent transfer to small shareholders. Therefore, factors that alter the pay-offs of small shareholders in a tender offer (e.g. supermajority rules, disclosure rules and non-voting shares) also alter the block premium. Finally, the paper argues that greenmail, like block trading, enables the controlling parties to preserve low levels of ownership concentration and large private control benefits. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics
|
| 关键词 | Block premia
Greenmail
Takeover regulation
Tender offers
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1924
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531060
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Angel de la Fuente. DP1924 What Kind of Regional Convergence?. 1998.
|
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