| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1986 |
| DP1986 Industrial Policy and Firm Heterogeneity | |
| Pedro Barros; Tore Nilssen | |
| 发表日期 | 1998-10-31 |
| 出版年 | 1998 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyse an economy that lacks a strong legal-political institutional infrastructure and is populated by multiple powerful groups. Powerful groups dynamically interact via a fiscal process that effectively allows open access to the aggregate capital stock. In equilibrium, this leads to slow economic growth and a 'voracity effect', by which a shock, such as a terms of trade windfall, perversely generates a more than proportionate increase in fiscal redistribution and reduces growth. We also show that a dilution in the concentration of power leads to faster growth and a less pro-cyclical response to shocks. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Differential games Economic growth Natural resources Terms of trade Voracity |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1986 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531117 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Pedro Barros,Tore Nilssen. DP1986 Industrial Policy and Firm Heterogeneity. 1998. |
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