| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1987 |
| DP1987 Moral Hazard and Non-Exclusive Contracts | |
| Danilo Guaitoli; Alberto Bisin | |
| 发表日期 | 1998-10-31 |
| 出版年 | 1998 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies product market competition under a strategic transparency decision. Dominant investors can influence information collection in the financial market, and thereby corporate transparency, by affecting market liquidity or the cost of information collection. More transparency on a firm's competitive position has both strategic advantages and disadvantages: in general, transparency results in higher variability of profits and output. Thus lenders prefer less information revelation through stock market trading, since this protects firms when in a weak competitive position, while equityholders prefer to make full use of the strategic advantage of a strong firm. We show that bank-controlled firms will tend to discourage trading to reduce price informativeness, while shareholder-run firms prefer more transparency. Our comparative statics show that bank control may fail to keep firms less transparent as global trading volumes rise. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Bank governance Competition Disclosure Market microstructure transparency |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1987 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531118 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Danilo Guaitoli,Alberto Bisin. DP1987 Moral Hazard and Non-Exclusive Contracts. 1998. |
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