| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1997 |
| DP1997 Industrial Organization and the New Industrial Policy | |
| David Audretsch | |
| 发表日期 | 1998-10-31 |
| 出版年 | 1998 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We propose a theory of supervision with endogenous transaction costs. A principle delegates part of his authority to a supervisor who can acquire soft information about an agent's productivity. If the supervisor were risk-neutral, the principal would simply make the better informed supervisor residual claimant for the hieracrchy's profit. Under risk aversion, the optimal contract trades-off the supervisor's incentives to reveal his information with an insurance motive. This contract can be identified with the one obtained in a simple hard information model of hierarchical collusion with exogenous transaction costs. Now, transaction costs are endogenous and depend on the collusion stake, the accuracy of the supervisory technology and the supervisor's degree of risk-aversion. We then discuss various implications of the model for the design and management of organizations. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Collusion Endogenous transaction costs Soft information supervision |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1997 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531126 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | David Audretsch. DP1997 Industrial Organization and the New Industrial Policy. 1998. |
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