| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2001 |
| DP2001 Voracity and Growth | |
| Aaron Tornell; Philip Lane | |
| 发表日期 | 1998-10-31 |
| 出版年 | 1998 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In a model with moral hazard and assymmetric information, we show that it can be welfare-improving to differentiate patent lives when firms have different R&D productivities. A uniform patent life provides excessive R&D incentive to low-productivity firms, and too little to high ones. The optimally differentiated patent scheme can be implemented through a menu of patent lives (or renewals) and associated fees. We characterize the optimal mechanism, and use simulation analysis to compare it with existing patent renewal systems and to illustrate the potential welfare gains from the optimal policy. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Mechanism design Patent protection Patent renewals R&d |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2001 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531129 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Aaron Tornell,Philip Lane. DP2001 Voracity and Growth. 1998. |
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