| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP2011
|
| DP2011 Can Short-Term Capital Controls Promote Capital Inflows |
| Tito Cordella
|
| 发表日期 | 1998-11-30
|
| 出版年 | 1998
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We consider the decision of an agent with time inconsistent preferences to undertake an irreversible investment that yields an uncertain current benefit and a delayed cost. We show that, if the flow of information revealed between periods when the investment is postponed is sufficiently high, there is an expected positive information value of waiting. Hence, as under time consistency, only projects with positive Net Present Value (NPV) are initiated. By contrast, if the amount of information transmitted is small, the agent's expected information value of waiting is negative. As a result, an individual may rationally decide to undertake an investment with negative NPV, only to prevent a future investment profitable from a future perspective but highly detrimental from the current viewpoint. We argue that this provides a rationale for haste, i.e. for the tendency of agents to embark on irreversible activities anticipating expected losses. We also discuss some applications of our theory such as impulse buying, destruction of the environment and preservation of endangered species. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization
|
| 关键词 | Haste
Investment under uncertainty
Time inconsistency
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2011
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531143
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Tito Cordella. DP2011 Can Short-Term Capital Controls Promote Capital Inflows. 1998.
|
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