| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2021 |
| DP2021 Hold-Up, Industrial Relations and Takeover Threats | |
| Gilles Chemla | |
| 发表日期 | 1998-11-30 |
| 出版年 | 1998 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper analyses the impact of takeover threats on long-term industrial relations. It argues that takeover threats dramatically affect the way in which an increase in workers' bargaining power affects (under)investment. Without loss of generality, we focus on the particular example of the economic consequences of union power in wage negotiations. In the absence of takeovers, the higher workers' bargaining power, the higher their wage flexibility and effort and the firm's capacity to invest, but the lower the firm's incentive to invest. Under the threat of a takeover reducing their expected wages, the workers' effort and wage flexibility are restricted and decrease with the workers' initial bargaining power. Various takeover defence mechanisms are compared. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Bargaining Esops investment Takeovers Wage flexibility |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2021 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531150 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Gilles Chemla. DP2021 Hold-Up, Industrial Relations and Takeover Threats. 1998. |
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