| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2037 |
| DP2037 Dynamic Adverse Selection and Debt | |
| Gilles Chemla; Antoine Faure-Grimaud | |
| 发表日期 | 1998-12-18 |
| 出版年 | 1998 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper argues that the recent Southeast Asian currency crises was caused by large prospective deficits associated with implicit bailout guarantees to failing banking systems. We articulate this view using a simple dynamic general equilibrium model whose key feature is that a speculative attack is inevitable once the present value of future government deficits rises. This is true regardless of the government's foreign reserve position or the initial level of its debt. While the government cannot prevent a speculative attack, it can affect its timing. The longer the delay, the higher inflation will be under flexible exchange rates. In our model we present empirical evidence in support of the three key assumptions: (i) that foreign reserves did not play a special role in the timing of the attack; (ii) that large losses in the banking sector were associated with large increases in governments' prospective deficits; and (iii) that the public knew that banks were in trouble before the currency rate crises. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Asia Banking crisis Currency crisis Speculative attacks |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2037 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531165 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Gilles Chemla,Antoine Faure-Grimaud. DP2037 Dynamic Adverse Selection and Debt. 1998. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
