| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP2042
|
| DP2042 Patent Suits: Do They Distort Research Incentives? |
| Mark Schankerman; Jean Lanjouw
|
| 发表日期 | 1998-12-18
|
| 出版年 | 1998
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | When is the modeller introducing more error when analysing a Cournot market with private cost information - when ignoring market power or when ignoring the impact of incomplete information? Is the welfare loss at the market outcome driven by private information or by market power? The answer, both to the positive and to the normative questions, is that in large enough markets abstracting from market power provides a much better approximation than abstracting from private information. More precisely, in a replica market with n firms facing increasing marginal costs of production subject to independent shocks, while the effect of market power decays quickly with n (it is of the order of 1/n for prices and 1/n2 for (per capita) expected total surplus (ETS)), the effect of private information decays more slowly with n (it is of the order of 1/ for prices and 1/n for ETS). Increasing n is more effective in reducing the welfare loss due to market power than the one due to private information. Simulations show that the result holds for moderately sized markets (small n) whenever uncertainty is significant. In this case information policy is more relevant than classical competition policy. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization
|
| 关键词 | Competition policy
Harberger triangle
Information sharing
market power
Private information
Rate of convergence
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2042
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531168
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Mark Schankerman,Jean Lanjouw. DP2042 Patent Suits: Do They Distort Research Incentives?. 1998.
|
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