| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2053 |
| DP2053 New Developments in Models of Search in the Labour Market | |
| Christopher Pissarides; Dale T. Mortensen | |
| 发表日期 | 1999-01-31 |
| 出版年 | 1999 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Consider a market where an informed monopolist sets the price for a good or asset with a value unknown to potential buyers. Upon observing the price, buyers may pay some cost for information about the value before deciding on purchases. To restrict buyer beliefs we generalize the idea of the Cho-Kreps 'intuitive criterion'. Then there is no separating equilibrium with fully revealing prices. Yet, as the cost of information acquisition becomes small, the equilibrium approaches the full information outcome and prices become perfectly revealing. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Information acquisition Price signalling Quality uncertainty |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2053 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531177 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Christopher Pissarides,Dale T. Mortensen. DP2053 New Developments in Models of Search in the Labour Market. 1999. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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