| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2057 |
| DP2057 Persistence and the German Unemployment Problem: Empirical Evidence on German Labour Market Flows | |
| Christoph Schmidt | |
| 发表日期 | 1999-01-31 |
| 出版年 | 1999 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In many long-term relationships, parties may be reluctant to reveal their private information in order to benefit from their informational advantage in the future. We point out that the strategic use of debt by an uninformed party induces another party to reveal private information. Our argument, which is consistent with casual observation, is based on the idea that (renegotiable) debt is a credible commitment to end the long-term relationship if information is not revealed. We show that the strategic advantage of debt increases with good durability and we briefly address the financing decision of a regulated firm. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Debt Durable good Dynamic adverse selection Financial constraint Ratchet effect Renegotiation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2057 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531181 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Christoph Schmidt. DP2057 Persistence and the German Unemployment Problem: Empirical Evidence on German Labour Market Flows. 1999. |
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