G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP2062
DP2062 Asymmetries in Housing and Financial Market Institutions and EMU
John Muellbauer; Duncan Maclennan; Mark Stephens
发表日期1999-01-31
出版年1999
语种英语
摘要We consider a market served by a safe and a risky seller. While the expensive safe seller can solve the problems of all consumers, the cheap risky seller can help a consumer only with a certain probability. The risky seller's success probabilities are distributed across consumers and by the choice of her quality the risky seller determines the shape of this distribution. If the risky seller fails, a consumer ends up with the safe seller, paying for the service twice. We study the price-quality competition between the two providers. We show that the principle of maximum product differentiation does not hold in our model, i.e. the risky seller does not choose the minimum quality level in order to relax price competition
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Price-quality competition Product differentiation
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp2062
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531183
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
John Muellbauer,Duncan Maclennan,Mark Stephens. DP2062 Asymmetries in Housing and Financial Market Institutions and EMU. 1999.
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