| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2062 |
| DP2062 Asymmetries in Housing and Financial Market Institutions and EMU | |
| John Muellbauer; Duncan Maclennan; Mark Stephens | |
| 发表日期 | 1999-01-31 |
| 出版年 | 1999 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider a market served by a safe and a risky seller. While the expensive safe seller can solve the problems of all consumers, the cheap risky seller can help a consumer only with a certain probability. The risky seller's success probabilities are distributed across consumers and by the choice of her quality the risky seller determines the shape of this distribution. If the risky seller fails, a consumer ends up with the safe seller, paying for the service twice. We study the price-quality competition between the two providers. We show that the principle of maximum product differentiation does not hold in our model, i.e. the risky seller does not choose the minimum quality level in order to relax price competition |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Price-quality competition Product differentiation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2062 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531183 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | John Muellbauer,Duncan Maclennan,Mark Stephens. DP2062 Asymmetries in Housing and Financial Market Institutions and EMU. 1999. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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