| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2071 |
| DP2071 Fickle Investors: an Impediment to Growth? | |
| Andrew Scott; Harald Uhlig | |
| 发表日期 | 1999-02-28 |
| 出版年 | 1999 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The paper first develops an economic analysis of the concept of shareholder value, describes its approach and discusses some open questions. It emphasizes the relationship between pledgeable income, monitoring and control rights using a unifying and simple framework. The paper then provides a first and preliminary analysis of the concept of the stakeholder society. It investigates whether the managerial incentives and the control structure described in the first part can be modified so as to promote the stakeholder society. It is shown that the implementation of the stakeholder society strikes three rocks: dearth of pledgeable income, deadlocks in decision-making, and lack of clear mission for management. While it fares better on those three grounds, shareholder value generates biased decision-making; the paper analyzes the costs and benefits of various methods of protecting noncontrolling stakeholders: covenants, exit options, flat claims, enlarged fiduciary duty. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Control rights Governance Managerial incentives Shareholder value Stakeholder society |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2071 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531191 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Andrew Scott,Harald Uhlig. DP2071 Fickle Investors: an Impediment to Growth?. 1999. |
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