G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP2071
DP2071 Fickle Investors: an Impediment to Growth?
Andrew Scott; Harald Uhlig
发表日期1999-02-28
出版年1999
语种英语
摘要The paper first develops an economic analysis of the concept of shareholder value, describes its approach and discusses some open questions. It emphasizes the relationship between pledgeable income, monitoring and control rights using a unifying and simple framework. The paper then provides a first and preliminary analysis of the concept of the stakeholder society. It investigates whether the managerial incentives and the control structure described in the first part can be modified so as to promote the stakeholder society. It is shown that the implementation of the stakeholder society strikes three rocks: dearth of pledgeable income, deadlocks in decision-making, and lack of clear mission for management. While it fares better on those three grounds, shareholder value generates biased decision-making; the paper analyzes the costs and benefits of various methods of protecting noncontrolling stakeholders: covenants, exit options, flat claims, enlarged fiduciary duty.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Control rights Governance Managerial incentives Shareholder value Stakeholder society
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp2071
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531191
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Andrew Scott,Harald Uhlig. DP2071 Fickle Investors: an Impediment to Growth?. 1999.
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