| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP2076
|
| DP2076 Maximum Sustainable Government Debt in the Overlapping Generations Model |
| Neil Rankin; Barbara Roffia
|
| 发表日期 | 1999-02-28
|
| 出版年 | 1999
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We try to demonstrate how economists may engage in research on comparative politics, relating the size and composition of government spending to the political system. A Downsian model of electoral competition and forward-looking voting indicates that majoritarian---as opposed to proportional---elections increase competition between parties by focusing it into some key marginal districts. This leads to less public goods, less rents for politicians, more redistribution and larger government. A model of legislative bargaining and backward-looking voting indicates that presidential---as opposed to parliamentary---regimes increase competition between both politicians and voters. This leads to less public goods, less rents for politicians, less redistribution, and smaller government. We confront these predictions with cross-country data from around 1990, controlling for economic and social determinants of government spending. We find strong and robust support for the prediction that the size of government is smaller under presidential regimes, and weaker support for the prediction that majoritarian elections are associated with less public goods. |
| 主题 | Public Economics
|
| 关键词 | Corruption
Electoral rules
Presidential system
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2076
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531196
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Neil Rankin,Barbara Roffia. DP2076 Maximum Sustainable Government Debt in the Overlapping Generations Model. 1999.
|
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