| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2077 |
| DP2077 Wages, Experience and Seniority | |
| Costas Meghir; Christian Dustmann | |
| 发表日期 | 1999-02-28 |
| 出版年 | 1999 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper surveys recent work in equilibrium models of labor markets characterized by search and recruitment frictions and by the need to reallocate workers across productive activities. The duration of unemployment and jobs and wage determination are treated as endogenous outcomes of job creation and job destruction decisions made by workers and firms. The solutions studied are dynamic stochastic equilibria in the sense that time and uncertainty are explicitly modeled, expectations are rational, private gains from trade are exploited and the actions taken by all agents are mutually consistent. A number of alternative wage determination mechanisms are explored, including the frequently studied non-cooperative wage bargaining and wage posting by firms. We use the framework to study the influence of alternative labor market institutions and policies on wages and unemployment. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Employment protection legislation Hiring subsidies Job creation Job destruction Matching Search Unemployment Vacancies Wage posting Wage subsidies |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2077 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531197 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Costas Meghir,Christian Dustmann. DP2077 Wages, Experience and Seniority. 1999. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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