全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP2083 Capital Markets and the Instability of Open Economies

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP2083
	DP2083 Capital Markets and the Instability of Open Economies
	Philippe Bacchetta; Philippe Aghion; Abhijit Banerjee
发表日期	1999-03-29
出版年	1999
语种	英语
摘要	Models of managerial short-termism rely on a number of assumption, such as limited availability of capital, fixed compensation schemes and an additive impact of managerial ability on revenue. We discuss the role of these assumption in generating short-termism. We show that when managerial ability has a multiplicative impact on revenue then the first best investment policy may require the implementation of short-term projects with negative NPV in order to generate information on managerial ability that can be exploited in later periods. We also show that, when the firm is free to design the compensation scheme, the first best is attained even if only short-term contracts are allowed. Short-termism is therefore the result of an optimal experimentation policy rather than the consequence of managerial misbehavior.
主题	Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization
关键词	Investment policy Managerial compensation
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp2083
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531208
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Philippe Bacchetta,Philippe Aghion,Abhijit Banerjee. DP2083 Capital Markets and the Instability of Open Economies. 1999.