G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP2093
DP2093 Transmission Rights and Market Power on Electric Power Networks I: Financial Rights
Jean Tirole; Paul L Joskow
发表日期1999-03-29
出版年1999
语种英语
摘要This paper develops a model of job creation and job destruction in a growing economy with embodied technical progress, that we use to analyze the political support for employment protection legislations such as the ones that are observed in most European countries. We analyze the possibility of Condorcet cycles due to the fact that workers about to become unemployed prefer both an increase and a reduction in firing costs over the status quo. Despite this problem, we show the existence of local, and sometimes global majority winners. In voting in favour of employment protection, incumbent employees trade off lower living standards (because employment protection maintains workers in less productive activities) against longer job duration. We show that the gains from, and consequently the political support for employment protection (as defined by maximumjob tenure) are larger, the lower the rate of creative destruction and the larger the worker's bargaining power. Numerical simulations suggest a hump-shaped response of firing costs to these variables, as well as a negative impact of exogenous turnover on employment protection.
主题Labour Economics ; Public Economics
关键词Creative destruction Firing costs Obsolescence Political economy Vintage capital
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp2093
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531211
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Jean Tirole,Paul L Joskow. DP2093 Transmission Rights and Market Power on Electric Power Networks I: Financial Rights. 1999.
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