| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2113 |
| DP2113 The Redistributive Effects of the EU Budget: an Analysis and Some Reflections on the Agenda 2000 Negotiations | |
| Angel de la Fuente; Rafael Domenech | |
| 发表日期 | 1999-03-29 |
| 出版年 | 1999 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Why do some workers sign contracts with high quitting penalties? Are these restrictions on the workers' mobility perverse for efficiency or workers' welfare? We postulate an answer that hinges on the degree of observability of the worker's performance by alternative employers. When performance is privately observed by the employer, then alternative employers face an adverse selection problem when competing for the worker. In equilibrium separations take the form of layoffs with compensation to the worker with no role for quitting fees. However, if performance is quite public this adverse selection problem is absent and buy-out fees serve to appropriate alternative employer's rents from the reallocation of the worker. In this case, efficiency is not affected. Bargaining power (both before and after signing the contract) determines whether buy-out fees are detrimental or not to the worker's welfare. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Buy-out fees Labour contracts Severence payments |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2113 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531227 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Angel de la Fuente,Rafael Domenech. DP2113 The Redistributive Effects of the EU Budget: an Analysis and Some Reflections on the Agenda 2000 Negotiations. 1999. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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