| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2139 |
| DP2139 The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective | |
| Mark Gertler; Richard Clarida; Jordi Gali | |
| 发表日期 | 1999-05-31 |
| 出版年 | 1999 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper investigates the role of campaign advertising and the opportunity of legal restrictions on it. An electoral race is modeled as a signalling game with three classes of players: a continuum of voters, two candidates, and one interest group. The group has non-verifiable insider information on the candidates' valence and, on the basis of this information, offers a contribution to each candidate in exchange for a favorable policy position. Candidates spend the contributions they receive on non-directly informative advertising. This paper shows that: (1) A separating equilibrium exists in which the group contributes to a candidate only if the insider information about that candidate is positive; (2) Although voters are fully rational, a ban on campaign advertising can be welfare-improving; and (3) Split contributions may arise in equilibrium (and should be prohibited). |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Advertising Campaign contributions Elections Split contributions Voter welfare |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2139 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531249 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Mark Gertler,Richard Clarida,Jordi Gali. DP2139 The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective. 1999. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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