G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP2154
DP2154 Interregional and International Risk Sharing and Lessons for EMU
Jacques MELITZ; Frederic Zumer
发表日期1999-05-31
出版年1999
语种英语
摘要In this paper, we incorporate a positive theory of unemployment insurance into a dynamic overlapping generations model with search-matching frictions and on-the-job learning-by-doing. The model shows that societies populated by identical rational agents, but differing in the initial distribution of human capital across agents, may choose very different unemployment insurance levels in a politico-economic equilibrium. The interaction between the political decision about the level of the unemployment insurance and the optimal search behavior of the unemployed gives rise to a self-reinforcing mechanism which may generate multiple steady-state equilibria. In particular, a European-type steady-state with high unemployment, low employment turnover and high insurance can co-exist with an American-type steady-state with low unemployment, high employment turnover and low unemployment insurance. A calibrated version of the model features two distinct steady-state equilibria with unemployment levels and duration rates resembling those of the U.S. and Europe, respectively.
主题International Macroeconomics ; Labour Economics
关键词Comparative advantage Employment Political equilibrium Search Specialization Unemployment insurance
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp2154
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531263
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Jacques MELITZ,Frederic Zumer. DP2154 Interregional and International Risk Sharing and Lessons for EMU. 1999.
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