| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2159 |
| DP2159 Minimum Wages and Employment in France and the United States | |
| francis kramarz; John M Abowd; David N Margolis | |
| 发表日期 | 1999-05-31 |
| 出版年 | 1999 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper develops an agency model in which firms can influence their own incentives to provide a non-contractible effort by contracting on other variables (e.g. by committing themselves to some verifiable investment). In such a model the firms' need for outside finance is shown to interact with their product market behavior in a non-monotonic way; for low levels of outside finance a rise in the need for outside finance reduces the manager's incentive to provide effort; but for high initial levels of outside finance a rise in the need for outside finance requires a commitment to higher effort which in turn is achieved through the contractible investment variables. This non-monotonicity has major implications for firm behavior, both when responding to demand shocks or when reacting to a change in the competitive environment. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Agency Competition Satisficing behaviour |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2159 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531267 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | francis kramarz,John M Abowd,David N Margolis. DP2159 Minimum Wages and Employment in France and the United States. 1999. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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