| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2176 |
| DP2176 Who Determines Mexican Trade Policy? | |
| Jaime de Melo; Marcelo Olarreaga; Jean-Marie Grether | |
| 发表日期 | 1999-06-28 |
| 出版年 | 1999 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study imperfect competition in the labor market when worker skills are continuously distributed within the population and a finite number of firms have different job requirements. The cost of training a worker depends on the difference between this worker's skill and the employer's needs. When firms cannot identify worker training costs in advance, firms pay workers equal wages, but workers absorb training costs. When firms can identify worker types before employment, firms can pay different net wages to workers with different training costs. Voters select the level of general education which is financed by a lump-sum tax. Workers are on average better off when firms can observe workers' skill for a given level of human capital, but the median voter prefers a higher level of general human capital when firms cannot observe worker types. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Information structure Job assignment Median voter Wage competition |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2176 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531283 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jaime de Melo,Marcelo Olarreaga,Jean-Marie Grether. DP2176 Who Determines Mexican Trade Policy?. 1999. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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