G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP2176
DP2176 Who Determines Mexican Trade Policy?
Jaime de Melo; Marcelo Olarreaga; Jean-Marie Grether
发表日期1999-06-28
出版年1999
语种英语
摘要We study imperfect competition in the labor market when worker skills are continuously distributed within the population and a finite number of firms have different job requirements. The cost of training a worker depends on the difference between this worker's skill and the employer's needs. When firms cannot identify worker training costs in advance, firms pay workers equal wages, but workers absorb training costs. When firms can identify worker types before employment, firms can pay different net wages to workers with different training costs. Voters select the level of general education which is financed by a lump-sum tax. Workers are on average better off when firms can observe workers' skill for a given level of human capital, but the median voter prefers a higher level of general human capital when firms cannot observe worker types.
主题Labour Economics
关键词Information structure Job assignment Median voter Wage competition
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp2176
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531283
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Jaime de Melo,Marcelo Olarreaga,Jean-Marie Grether. DP2176 Who Determines Mexican Trade Policy?. 1999.
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