| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2185 |
| DP2185 Integration, Agglomeration and the Political Economics of Factor Mobility | |
| Jacques-François Thisse; Gianmarco Ottaviano | |
| 发表日期 | 1999-07-26 |
| 出版年 | 1999 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We show how a stability pact based on deficit sanctions eliminates the exacerbation of debt accumulation that may arise from monetary unification. Moreover, by making sanctions contingent upon the economic situation of countries, the stability pact provides for risk sharing. Differences in initial debt levels, however, reduce the scope for unanimous support for a pact. We introduce also endogenous ``fiscal discipline'' whose unobservability leads to moral hazard in its provision. If countries are ex ante identical, it is nevertheless optimal to make sanctions at least to some extent contingent on countries' economic situation. However, with cross-country differences in the costs of providing discipline, some countries may oppose such contingency. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Fiscal discipline Monetary union Public debt Risk sharing Stability pact |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2185 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531292 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jacques-François Thisse,Gianmarco Ottaviano. DP2185 Integration, Agglomeration and the Political Economics of Factor Mobility. 1999. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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