| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2189 |
| DP2189 Renegotiation Before Contract Execution | |
| Achim Wambach | |
| 发表日期 | 1999-07-26 |
| 出版年 | 1999 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Currency crises that coincide with banking crises tend to share four elements. First, governments provide guarantees to domestic and foreign bank creditors. Second, banks do not hedge their exchange rate risk. Third, there is a lending boom before the crises. Finally, when the currency/banking collapse occurs interest rates rise and there is a persistent decline in output. This paper proposes an explanation for these regularities. We show that government guarantees lower interest rates, and generate an economic boom. But they also lead to a more fragile banking system: banks choose not to hedge exchange rate risk. When the fixed exchange rate is abandoned in favor of a crawling peg banks go bankrupt, the domestic interest rate rises, real wages fall and output declines. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Fixed exchange rate systems Government guarantees Hedging |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2189 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531296 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Achim Wambach. DP2189 Renegotiation Before Contract Execution. 1999. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
| 个性服务 |
| 推荐该条目 |
| 保存到收藏夹 |
| 导出为Endnote文件 |
| 谷歌学术 |
| 谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
| [Achim Wambach]的文章 |
| 百度学术 |
| 百度学术中相似的文章 |
| [Achim Wambach]的文章 |
| 必应学术 |
| 必应学术中相似的文章 |
| [Achim Wambach]的文章 |
| 相关权益政策 |
| 暂无数据 |
| 收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
