| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2191 |
| DP2191 How Regions Converge | |
| Wilbur John Coleman II; Francesco Caselli | |
| 发表日期 | 1999-07-26 |
| 出版年 | 1999 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We examine a stark setting in which security or protection can be provided by self-governing groups of by for-profit entrepreneurs: kings, lords, or mafia dons. Though self-governance is best for the population, it faces problems of long-term viability. Typically, in providing security the stable market structure involves competing lords, a condition that leads to a tragedy of coercion: all the savings from the provision of collective protection are dissipated and welfare can be as low or lower than in the absence of a state. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Governance Origin of state Protection Security |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2191 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531298 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Wilbur John Coleman II,Francesco Caselli. DP2191 How Regions Converge. 1999. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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