| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2197 |
| DP2197 Monetary Policy Issues for the Eurosystem | |
| Lars E.O. Svensson | |
| 发表日期 | 1999-08-03 |
| 出版年 | 1999 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | By offering or choosing a contract the informed agent might reveal information to the principal which could be used for immediate renegotiation. This is discussed in an axiomatic approach. We show that if, given the revealed information, there exists a contract which is preferred by everyone, the former contract could not have been renegotiation proof. For private values and common values of the ?Spence' type, a generalized Coase conjecture holds: The principal cannot raise her profit by offering inefficient contracts to the agent. Only for common values of the ?Rothschild-Stiglitz' type, inefficient, but pooling, contracts are possible. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Coase conjecture Principal-agent models Renegotiation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2197 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531303 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Lars E.O. Svensson. DP2197 Monetary Policy Issues for the Eurosystem. 1999. |
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