G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP2205
DP2205 The Fallacy of the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level
Willem Buiter
发表日期1999-08-31
出版年1999
语种英语
摘要The literature on monetary policy games establishes that policy makers' attempts to boost employment above the 'natural' rate are futile and result in an inflationary bias when wage setters have rational expectations and the policy maker cannot precommit. This implies that a variation of the policy maker's degree of inflation aversion does not have a systematic effect on the employment level. This paper shows that this last neutrality result hinges crucially on the assumption that wage setters are atomistic. In the presence of non-atomistic agents, who set nominal wages and have monopolistic power, the policy maker's inflation aversion may have a systematic effect on equilibrium employment even if agents have rational expectations and complete information. The model is used to re-assess the welfare implications of monetary policy delegation to a 'conservative' central bank.
主题International Macroeconomics
关键词inflation Monopolistic power Non-atomism Non-neutrality Unemployment Unions
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp2205
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531311
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Willem Buiter. DP2205 The Fallacy of the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level. 1999.
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