| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2206 |
| DP2206 Fiscal Forecasting: the Track Record of the IMF, OECD, and EC | |
| Michael Artis; Massimiliano Marcellino | |
| 发表日期 | 1999-08-31 |
| 出版年 | 1999 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The literature argues that the benefits of an independent Central Bank accrue at no cost to the real side. In this paper, we argue that the lack of correlation between monetary autonomy and output variability is due to the proactive role of fiscal policy when faced with rigid monetary objectives. None of the attempts in the literature to measure these correlations allow for a changing fiscal role. As monetary policy is handled by an independent authority, fiscal and wage/social protection policies remain an instrument in the hands of national governments. We find that so long as the two authorities pursue their goals independently of each other, a conflict arises which is exacerbated as preferences diverge. Further to that we find that the establishment of a conservative Central Bank encourages more left-wing preferences amongst the public (as reflected in the governments they elect). And the election of more left-wing governments makes it more difficult for each authority to reach their own preferred objectives, unless they are able to cooperate. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Accountability Central bank independence Fiscal policy Political uncertainty |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2206 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531312 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael Artis,Massimiliano Marcellino. DP2206 Fiscal Forecasting: the Track Record of the IMF, OECD, and EC. 1999. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
