| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2219 |
| DP2219 An Independent Central Bank Faced With Elected Governments | |
| Andrew Hughes Hallett; Maria Demertzis | |
| 发表日期 | 1999-08-31 |
| 出版年 | 1999 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Why does the largest US welfare programme select its recipients by their age, rather than by their earnings or wealth? In a dynamic efficient overlapping generation economy with earnings heterogeneity, we analyze a welfare system composed of a within-cohort redistribution scheme and an unfunded social security system. The programme's size is determined in a bidimensional majoritarian election. For enough income inequality and elderly in the population, both welfare programs are supported as a structure-induced political equilibrium of a voting game played by successive generation of voters. Social security is sustained by a voting coalition of retirees and low-income young, intragenerational redistribution by low-income young. Two features are crucial: the retirees' political power, deriving from their homogeneous voting, and the intragenerational redistribution component of the social security. Therefore, to assess how changes in inequality affect the welfare state, the income distribution should be decomposed by age groups. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Income equality Social security Structure-induced equilibrium |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2219 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531325 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Andrew Hughes Hallett,Maria Demertzis. DP2219 An Independent Central Bank Faced With Elected Governments. 1999. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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