| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2242 |
| DP2242 The European Business Cycle | |
| Michael Artis; Hans-Martin Krolzig; Juan Toro | |
| 发表日期 | 1999-09-30 |
| 出版年 | 1999 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this paper we combine a non-cooperative decision-making game in a federal structure with two levels of interest and an incomplete contract which sets the rules of the game. The question we pose is how to combine ex ante efficiency of the design with ex post efficiency of the outcomes in the decision-making game. The paper shows that in common policies there are no designs that lead to both types of efficiency but flexible integration is a way to achieve both. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics ; International Trade and Regional Economics |
| 关键词 | Incomplete contracts Integration Legislative bargaining Non-cooperative games |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2242 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531343 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael Artis,Hans-Martin Krolzig,Juan Toro. DP2242 The European Business Cycle. 1999. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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