| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2259 |
| DP2259 Government Size and Automatic Stabilizers: International and Intranational Evidence | |
| Antonio Fatas; Ilian Mihov | |
| 发表日期 | 1999-10-29 |
| 出版年 | 1999 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Delegation to independent bodies whose preference can be different from those of the government has been shown to have beneficial commitment benefits in areas as widely diverse as monetary policy and trade. This paper addresses the case for delegation in the context of a cost-reimbursement procurement problem. Our solution combines several features of the modern regulatory environment: government commitment to a particular regulator, the provision of independence to that regulator, and heterogeneity across regulators available. We find that delegation to an independent industry regulator, whose preferences are more pro-rent than those of the government, can raise welfare by mitigating the ratchet effect. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Delegation Procurement Ratchet effect |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2259 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531355 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Antonio Fatas,Ilian Mihov. DP2259 Government Size and Automatic Stabilizers: International and Intranational Evidence. 1999. |
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