| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP2260
|
| DP2260 Unionisation and Foreign Direct Investment |
| Dermot Leahy; Catia Montagna
|
| 发表日期 | 1999-10-29
|
| 出版年 | 1999
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We develop a theory of political transitions inspired in part by the experiences of Western Europe and Latin America. Nondemocratic societies are controlled by a rich elite. The initially disenfranchised poor can contest power by threatening social unrest or revolution, and this may force the elite to democratize. Democracy may not consolidate because it is more redistributive than a nondemocratic regime, and this gives the elite an incentive to mount a coup. Because inequality makes democracy more costly for the elite, highly unequal societies are less likely to consolidate democracy and may end up oscillating between regimes or in a nondemocratic repressive regime. An unequal society is likely to experience fiscal volatility, but the relationship between inequality and redistribution is nonmonotonic; societies with intermediate levels of inequality consolidate democracy and redistribute more than both very equal and very unequal countries. We also show that asset redistribution, such as educational and land reform, may be used to consolidate both democratic and nondemocratic regimes. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics
; Public Economics
|
| 关键词 | Democracy
Dictatorship
Inequality
Political instability
Redistribution
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2260
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531356
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Dermot Leahy,Catia Montagna. DP2260 Unionisation and Foreign Direct Investment. 1999.
|
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