| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP2270
|
| DP2270 Procurement Favouritism and Technology Adoption |
| Fernando Branco
|
| 发表日期 | 1999-10-29
|
| 出版年 | 1999
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We analyze the decision of individuals with time inconsistent preferences who undertake irreversible activities yielding either a current cost and a future benefit or a current benefit and a future cost. We first show that, when benefits come earlier than costs, the individual faces a coordination problem with himself that results in multiple, rankable equilibria. Some of these equilibria may exhibit rush, in the sense that the activity is undertaken 'too early' (i.e. with a negative payoff). Multiplicity explains why individuals succeed or not in avoiding temptations, depending on 'the degree of trust in their future decision'. Second, we prove that competition between agents for the same activity can be beneficial for them both when costs come before and after benefits: it decreases the agents' incentives to procrastinate (i.e. to undertake the activity 'too late') in the former case and to rush in the latter. Last, complementarity of
tasks exacerbates the tendency to rush and to procrastinate. Under procrastination, it may even imply that projects which are valuable for all agents are never undertaken. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization
|
| 关键词 | Decision makiing under uncertainty
Procrastination
Rush
Time inconsistency
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2270
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531363
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Fernando Branco. DP2270 Procurement Favouritism and Technology Adoption. 1999.
|
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