| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2316 |
| DP2316 Monetary Policy and Multiple Equilibria | |
| Jess Benhabib; Martín Uribe; Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé | |
| 发表日期 | 1999-12-17 |
| 出版年 | 1999 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper looks at how the reputation of a monetary policy-making committee is jointly determined with the reputations of its individual members. I ask whether individuals have more or less incentive to gain a reputation for being tough on inflation when they are part of a group. I examine the effect of increased transparency - in the form of publishing the votes of individual members - on individuals' incentives to appear hard nosed. I look at how other institutional features of central banks affect the policy making body's incentive to refrain from inflation. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Central banks Collective decision making Reputation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2316 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531407 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jess Benhabib,Martín Uribe,Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé. DP2316 Monetary Policy and Multiple Equilibria. 1999. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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