| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2330 |
| DP2330 R&D Cooperation and Spillovers: Some Empirical Evidence | |
| Reinhilde Veugelers; Bruno Cassiman | |
| 发表日期 | 1999-12-17 |
| 出版年 | 1999 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We examine the implications for borrowing costs of including collective-action clauses in loan contracts. For a sample of some 2,000 international bonds, we compare the spreads on bonds subject to UK governing law, which typically include collective-action clauses, with spreads on bonds subject to US law, which do not. Contrary to the assertions of some market participants, we find that collective-action clauses in fact reduce the cost of borrowing for more credit-worthy issuers, who appear to benefit from the ability to avail themselves of an orderly restructuring process. In contrast, less credit-worthy issuers pay, if anything, higher spreads. We conjecture that for less credit-worthy borrowers the advantages of orderly restructuring are offset by the moral hazard and default risk associated with the presence of renegotiation-friendly loan provisions. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Debt Imf Restructuring |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2330 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531421 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Reinhilde Veugelers,Bruno Cassiman. DP2330 R&D Cooperation and Spillovers: Some Empirical Evidence. 1999. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
