| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2351 |
| DP2351 Optimal Debt Contracts and Moral Hazard Along the Business Cycle | |
| PIETRO REICHLIN; Paolo Siconolfi | |
| 发表日期 | 2000-01-31 |
| 出版年 | 2000 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper presents an analysis of the failure and completion rates of graduate students in economics at three universities in The Netherlands. We find that an indicator of the research productivity of the supervisor is an important determinant of the completion and dropout rates. However, this effect seems due to the fact that supervisors with a good research record attract and select better students. There is no evidence of an independent effect of having a supervisor who is an active researcher. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Duration analysis Education Graduate program |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2351 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531441 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | PIETRO REICHLIN,Paolo Siconolfi. DP2351 Optimal Debt Contracts and Moral Hazard Along the Business Cycle. 2000. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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