| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2357 |
| DP2357 Why Mergers Reduce Profits, and Raise Share-Prices | |
| Johan Stennek; Sven-Olof Fridolfsson | |
| 发表日期 | 2000-01-31 |
| 出版年 | 2000 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | It has been argued that the inflationary bias of discretionary monetary policy can be eliminated, and welfare maximized, by the appointment of a central banker who does not care at all about inflation (a 'populist central banker'). We show that this result hinges crucially on the assumption that wage bargaining occurs in terms of the real wage. When the strategic variable chosen by the unions is the nominal wage, the above result is true only in the special case of a single, all-encompassing, union. In the more general case of multiple unions, however, inflation increases linearly with their number and a populist central bank may turn out to be bad for welfare. The paper also shows that whether unions bargain their wages in nominal or in real terms influences the number of channels through which monetary policy can have systematic effects on real variables. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Central bank conservatism Monetary policy games Non-atomism Wage setting |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2357 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531447 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Johan Stennek,Sven-Olof Fridolfsson. DP2357 Why Mergers Reduce Profits, and Raise Share-Prices. 2000. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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