| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2374 |
| DP2374 Searching for Non-Linear Effects of Fiscal Policy: Evidence from Industrial and Developing Countries | |
| Francesco Giavazzi; Marco Pagano; Tullio Jappelli | |
| 发表日期 | 2000-02-29 |
| 出版年 | 2000 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper explores how motivating an incumbent CEO to make investments that improve the effectiveness of the firm organization under his management interacts with the replacement policy of the board of directors. We characterize the optimal compensation package (including severance pay) under governance structures that differ in the power that the incumbent CEO has on the board of directors. We explain why yielding the incumbent CEO some control of the board (entrenchment) can be desirable and offer predictions on when this arrangement is optimal. We also examine the correlation between the elements of his compensation package and the structure of the board. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Board of directors Corporate governance Severance payment Takeovers |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2374 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531463 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Francesco Giavazzi,Marco Pagano,Tullio Jappelli. DP2374 Searching for Non-Linear Effects of Fiscal Policy: Evidence from Industrial and Developing Countries. 2000. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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