G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP2381
DP2381 Elected Versus Appointed Regulators: Theory And Evidence
Tim Besley; Stephen Coate
发表日期2000-02-29
出版年2000
语种英语
摘要The answer to this question is "yes". We re-examine noncooperative and cooperative equilibria under perfect capital mobility. To this end, we develop a two-country optimal growth model with endogenous national fiscal policies. The channel for interdependence is distortionary income taxes. We study both the Residence and Source principle of international taxation. National governments play Stackelberg vis-à-vis private agents, while they can play either Nash or cooperate vis-à-vis each other. We solve for Markov-perfect (time consistent) equilibria. We show that the pertinent Nash equilibria are degenerate. Thus, under both the Residence and Source principle, only cooperative equilibria can exist. The driving force is perfect capital mobility. This is a new result that provides a strong argument for world tax coordination. When we solve for cooperative equilibria, we show that it is optimal to set a common tax rate across countries, irrespective of the principle of international taxation (Residence or Source) and differences across countries. A cooperative solution under the Source principle may be more difficult to implement than under the Residence principle.
主题International Macroeconomics ; Public Economics
关键词Markov-perfect equilibrium Optimal taxation Residence and source principle Tax coordination
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp2381
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531469
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Tim Besley,Stephen Coate. DP2381 Elected Versus Appointed Regulators: Theory And Evidence. 2000.
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