| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2391 |
| DP2391 Optimal Corporate Governance Structures | |
| Javier Suarez; Andres Almazan | |
| 发表日期 | 2000-02-29 |
| 出版年 | 2000 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this paper we investigate central bank accountability by looking at the effect of transparency in a simple monetary policy game with an overriding mechanism. Monetary policy is transparent if there is little uncertainty about the central banker's preferences for inflation stabilization relative to output stabilization. Transparency enhances the central bank's accountability. The paper shows that transparency leads to a lower expected rate of inflation and less stabilization of supply shocks. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Accountability Central banks monetary policy transparency |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2391 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531475 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Javier Suarez,Andres Almazan. DP2391 Optimal Corporate Governance Structures. 2000. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
| 个性服务 |
| 推荐该条目 |
| 保存到收藏夹 |
| 导出为Endnote文件 |
| 谷歌学术 |
| 谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
| [Javier Suarez]的文章 |
| [Andres Almazan]的文章 |
| 百度学术 |
| 百度学术中相似的文章 |
| [Javier Suarez]的文章 |
| [Andres Almazan]的文章 |
| 必应学术 |
| 必应学术中相似的文章 |
| [Javier Suarez]的文章 |
| [Andres Almazan]的文章 |
| 相关权益政策 |
| 暂无数据 |
| 收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
