G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP2414
DP2414 Social Harmony At The Boundaries Of The Welfare State: Immigrants And Social Transfers
Arye L. Hillman; Gil S Epstein
发表日期2000-04-28
出版年2000
语种英语
摘要In this paper we analyse the recent efforts of the international financial institutions to limit the moral hazard created by their assistance to crisis countries. We question the wisdom of the case-by-case approach taken in Pakistan, Ecuador, Romania and Ukraine. We show that because default and restructuring are so painful and costly, it is simply not time consistent for the IFIs to plan to stand aside if the markets refuse to roll over maturing claims, restructure problem debts, or provide new money. Because these realities create an incentive to disburse even if investors fail to comply, the IFIs are then placed in the position of having to back down on their previous conditionality, which undermines their credibility. And since investors are aware of these facts, their behaviour is unlikely to be modified by the IFIs' less-than-credible statements of intent. Hence, this approach to 'bailing in the private sector' will not work. Fortunately, there is an alternative: introducing collective-action clauses into loan agreements. This, and not ad hoc efforts to bail in the private sector, is the forward-looking solution to the moral hazard problem.
主题International Macroeconomics
关键词Crises Imf Moral hazard
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp2414
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531498
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Arye L. Hillman,Gil S Epstein. DP2414 Social Harmony At The Boundaries Of The Welfare State: Immigrants And Social Transfers. 2000.
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